Standard asset pricing models assume (i) that there is complete agreement among investors about probability distributions of future payoffs on assets, and (ii) investors choose asset holdings based solely on anticipated payoffs; that is, investment assets are not also consumption goods. Both assumptions are unrealistic. We provide a simple framework for studying ho w disagreement and tastes for assets as consumption goods can affect asset prices.
equilibrium, prices are set as if all investors know the joint distribution of future payoffs, so CAPM pricing holds. Again, the conditions under which this is true are restrictive. Papers in this spirit include Admati (1985) , DeMarzo and Skiadas (1998) , and Biais, Bossaerts, and Spatt (2003) .
The existing work on disagreement is rather mathematical. Our goal is to provide a simple framework for analyzing how disagreement can affect asset prices. For simplicity, we focus on a world that conforms to all assumptions of the CAPM, except complete agreement.
We argue that our framework for analyzing disagreement is useful for characterizing the price effects that arise in behavioral finance models that assume expectations are irrational, for example, the models of underreaction and overreaction to information of Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) .
Another common assumption in asset pricing models is that investors are only concerned with the payoffs from their portfo lios; that is, investment assets are not also consumption goods.
This assumption is arbitrary. For example, loyalty or the desire to belong may cause an investor to hold more of his employer's stock than is justified based on payoff characteristics (Cohe n, 2003) . Or there may be investors who get pleasure out of holding the common stock of strong companies (growth stocks) and dislike holding distressed (value) stocks, and these tastes affect investment decisions (Daniel and Titman, 1997) . Socially responsible investing (Geczy, Stambaugh, and Levin, 2003) is another example. Tax considerations (the lock-in effect of unrealized capital gains) and any restrictions on investor holdings of securities (for, example, stock issued to employees that must be held for a minimum period) can also have price effects like those due to tastes for assets as consumption goods.
Our second goal is to characterize the potential asset pricing effects of tastes for assets as consumption goods. It turns out that the simple framework we use to study disagreement can also be used to analyze this issue.
Our interest in these topics is in part due to evidence that the CAPM fails to explain average stock returns. Two CAPM anomalies attract the most attention and controversy. The first is the value effect (Statman, 1980 , Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein, 1985 , Fama and French, 1992 : stocks with low prices relative to fundamentals like cash flow or book value have higher average returns than predicted by the CAPM. The second is the mo mentum effect of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) : stocks with high returns over the last year tend to continue to have high returns for a few months, and low short-term past returns also tend to persist.
We argue that some of the stories offered to explain the value and momentum effects fall under the rubric of disagreement while others in effect assume tastes for assets as consumption goods. Moreover, even models (like Fama and French, 1993 ) that propose multifactor versions of Merton's (1973) ICAPM to explain CAPM anomalies leave open the possibility that ICAPM pricing arises because of investor tastes for assets as consumption goods, rather than through the more standard ICAPM channel -investor demands to hedge uncertainty about future consumption-investment opportunities.
We add no new results likely to move readers toward one or another explanation of the empirical failures of the CAPM. But we do offer a simple framework in which to view competing stories.
We begin (Section I) with an analysis of the asset pricing implications of disagreement.
Section II turns to tastes for assets as consumption goods. Section III concludes.
I. Disagreement
For a simple perspective on the effects of disagreement, we focus on a one-period world where all assumptions of the Sharpe (1964 ) -Lintner (1965 CAPM hold except complete agreement. Specifically, suppose there are two types of investors: group A, the informed, who get the joint distribution of one-period asset payoffs right, and group D, the misinformed, who get it wrong. Group D investors need not agree among themselves. Does asset pricing conform to the CAPM despite the absence of complete agreement? The answer is no, except in special cases.
A. The CAPM
Market equilibrium in this world is easy to describe. Each investor combines riskfree borrowing or lending with what the investor takes to be the tangency portfolio from the minimum-variance frontier for risky securities. The informed investors in group A choose the true tangency portfolio, call it T. But except in special cases, the misinformed investors of group D do not choose T. Indeed, the perceived tangency portfolio can be different for each group D investor. The aggregate of the risky portfolios of misinformed investors is called portfolio D.
Market clearing prices require that the value-weight market portfolio of risky assets, M, is the wealth-weighted aggregate of portfolio D and the true tangency portfolio T chosen by informed investors. If x is the share of informed investors in total wealth invested in risky assets, n is the number of risky assets, and w jM , w jT , and w jD are the weights of asset j in portfolios M, T, and D, the market clearing condition can be expressed as, (1) w jM = x w jT + (1-x) w jD , j = 1, 2, …, n;
or, in terms of returns,
All variables in (1) are, of course, outputs of a market equilibrium; equilibrium asset prices determine the weights of assets in M, T, and D, as well as the wealth shares of investors. Figure 1 illustrates the relations among portfolios M, T, and D. The tangency portfolio T is the portfolio on the true minimum-variance frontier for risky assets (curve ABC) with the highest possible Sharpe ratio,
where E(R T ) and s T are the expected return and standard deviation of the return on T, and R f is the riskfree rate. Group D investors are misinformed so their aggregate portfolio D is not typically the true tangency portfolio, and the Sharpe ratio for D, S D , is less than S T . Since the market portfolio M is a positively weighted portfolio of T and D, M is between T and D on the hyperbola that links them and S M is between S D and S T .
In the CAPM, the true tangency portfolio is the market portfolio. When all assumptions of the CAPM hold except complete agreement -and there is at least one investor in each group (so 0 < x < 1) -equation (1) implies that T is M only if D is also M. In other words, the CAPM holds only if misinformed investors as a group hold the market portfolio. This can happen when the mistaken beliefs of the misinformed wash (they are on average correct), or when prices are fully revealing (which also says that, given prices, beliefs are on average correct). But the simple message from (1) is that a necessary condition for CAPM pricing when there is disagreement is that the misinformed in aggregate hold the market portfolio. In short, without complete agreement, the central prediction of the CAPM -that securities are priced to make the market portfolio mean-variance-efficient -does not typically hold. Equation (1) implies that we get CAPM pricing (the market portfolio is truly MVE) if and only if, for whatever reason, the aggregate risky portfolio of the misinformed is the true tangency portfolio T, which is also held by the informed. The market clearing condition of equation (1) then implies that T must be the market portfolio M.
B. Market Efficiency
Is the pricing of securities rational (informationally efficient) in the absence of complete agreement? It is reasonable to argue that when the misinformed do not in aggregate hold the tangency portfolio, their erroneous beliefs affect asset prices, so prices are some what irrational.
Can one measure the extent to which prices are irrational? Since all assumptions of the CAPM hold, except complete agreement, deviations from the expected return predictions of the CAPM can be attributed to irrational pricing produced by disagreement. The CAPM predicts that the market portfolio is the tangency portfolio. Thus, the difference between the Sharpe ratio for the true tangency portfolio and the Sharpe ratio for market portfolio, S T -S M , is one measure of the aggregate effect of misinformed beliefs on asset prices.
Since all investors try to combine the riskfree asset with the risky portfolio that has the highest Sharpe ratio, it is tempting to conclude that S T -S M and S M -S D measure (respectively) the gain to informed investors and the loss to the misinformed due to market inefficiency, that is, the effects of misinformed beliefs on asset prices. This is true, but only relative to the equilibrium obtained with informed and misinformed investors. One cannot conclude that the presence of the misinformed makes the informed better off, since this conclusion involves a comparison of the welfare implications of alternative equilibria, about which we know nothing.
The difference in Sharpe ratios, S T -S M , is a good measure of aggregate mispricing, but Jensen's (1968) alpha is better if we want to measure deviations from the CAPM for specific assets. If ß jM is the market beta of asset j (the slope in the regression of its return on the market return), the asset's CAPM expected return is,
Jensen's a is the deviation of the actual expected return from its CAPM expected value,
The cross-section of a jM , j = 1,…, n, for the n available assets gives a full picture of the effects of deviations from CAPM pricing on the cross-section of expected returns.
Unless the misinformed happen to hold the true tangency portfolio T, so T, M, and D are identical, Jensen's alpha for T is positive. To see this, divide a TM by the standard deviation of
where ?(R T , R M ) is the correlation between R T and R M . Since the Sharpe ratio for T is greater than the Sharpe ratio for M, and ?(R T , R M ) is less than one, a TM is positive. And like S T -S M , a TM is an overall measure of the effects of mispricing on expected returns. Moreover, Jensen's alpha for the market portfolio, a MM , is zero. Since equation (3) implies that,
we can infer that a DM for the aggregate risky portfolio of misinformed investors is negative.
Like S M -S D , a DM is a measure of the cost borne by misinformed investors due to mistaken beliefs.
A problem, of course, is that we do not know the composition of the true tangency portfolio T. And the problem is serious. The power of complete agreement in the CAPM is that, along with the model's other assumptions, it allows us to specify that the MVE tangency portfolio T is the market portfolio M. Thus, the composition of T is known. The first-order condition for MVE portfolios, applied to the market portfolio, can then be used to specify expected returns on assets -the pricing equation of the CAPM.
Without complete agreement, using theory to specify T, or any other portfolio that must be on the true MVE boundary, is probably a lost cause, except for special cases where the misinformed in aggregate end up holding T . This likely means that, without complete agreement, testable predictions about how expected returns relate to risk are also a lost cause.
And the problem is not special to the CAPM. In short, complete agreement is pretty much a necessary ingredient of testable asset pricing models -unless we are willing to specify the nature of the beliefs of the misinformed and exactly how they affect prices.
If disagreement is the only potential violation of CAPM assumptions, we can, however, use the F-test of Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (GRS 1989) to infer whether disagreement indeed affects asset prices. The GRS test in effect constructs a candidate for the true tangency portfolio T using sample estimates of expected returns and the covariance matrix of returns on the assets used in the test, including the market portfolio. The F-test then measures whether the tangency portfolio constructed from the full set of assets has a reliably higher Sharpe ratio than the market portfolio alone (S T > S M ). If disagreement is the only potential violation of CAPM assumptions, the GRS test allows us to infer whether it has measurable effects on asset prices.
C. Limits to Arbitrage
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that because most arbitrage is risky, arbitrageurs do not fully offset the price effects of misinformed investors. Our analysis provides a simple equilibrium perspective on the problem. Market-clearing prices must be set so that the portfolios of the informed and the misinformed add up to the market. If the misinformed in aggregate do not hold the market portfolio M, then (in a world where all CAPM assumptions except complete agreement hold) the true tangency portfolio chosen by the informed cannot be M. Thus, in general, the actions of the informed do not lead us back to CAPM pricing.
Since informed investors hold the complement of the aggregate portfolio of misinformed investors, the informed do to some extent offset the price effects of the misinformed. But the offset is not complete. The pricing of securities must induce the informed to overweight (relative to the market portfolio) the assets the misinformed underweight, and vice versa. Since this means that the risky portfolio of the informed (the true tangency portfolio T) is not the market portfolio M, some price effects of erroneous beliefs remain. The se price effects disappear (we get CAPM pricing) only in the special case where the misinformed in aggregate hold M, so the informed also hold M, and T must be M. But when this happens, it is a result of the offsetting beliefs of different misinformed investors, not the offsetting portfolio actions of the informed.
There is an obvious special case where the informed do totally offset the price effects of the mis informed. One cannot have a n equilibrium in which the erroneous beliefs of the misinformed produce a riskless arbitrage for the informed, that is, a zero variance return that exceeds the riskfree rate. The actions of the informed ensure prices that preempt riskless arbitrage and so totally offset actions of the misinformed that might produce one.
D. Examples
Some examples give life to the analysis. A common hypothesis in behavioral finance is that investors under-react to firm-specific information (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subramanyam, 1998) . Suppose this is a characteristic of misinformed investors, and suppose we are otherwise in a world where the assumptions of the CAPM hold. As a result of the ir beliefs, the misinformed tend to buy too little (relative to market weights) of the assets that get hit with positive news and too much of the assets with negative news. Since in aggregate all assets must be held, asset pricing must i nduce informed investors to hold the complement of the portfolio chosen by the misinformed. As a result, the informed offset to some extent the price effects of erroneous beliefs. The offset is not complete, however, since the informed do not hold the market portfolio (T is not M), which means we do not get CAPM pricing.
It is important to note that in a multiperiod world, the price effects of under-reaction to current news by misinformed investors do not disappear with the passage of time, unless the beliefs of the misinformed about today's news converge to the beliefs of the informed. Without movement by the misinformed, the informed (who always hold the complement of portfolio D)
have no incentive to take further actions that erase the price effects of the misinformed. For prices to converge to rational values, the truth must become known to one and all, so eventually there is complete agreement about old news.
Another common behavioral story is that investors do not understand that profitability tends to mean-revert. As a result, investors over-extrapolate persistent good times or bad times of firms, causing growth stocks to be overvalued and distressed (value) stocks to be undervalued (DeBondt and Thaler, 1987, Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998) . Suppose such overreaction is a characteristic of our misinformed investors. Then, in a world where all CAPM assumptions except complete agreement hold, the misinformed underweight value stocks (relative to market weights) and the y overweight growth stocks. Informed investors partially offset the actions of the misinformed; the informed overweight value stocks and underweight growth stocks. But the offset is incomplete. Market clearing prices again simply induce the informed to hold the complement of the aggregate portfolio of the misinformed. Although it is the true tangency portfolio, the complement is not the market portfolio, so we do not get CAPM pricing.
Moreover, the prices of today's value and growth stocks eventually converge to rational values only when the beliefs of the misinformed converge to those of the informed. This seems to be the scenario Debondt and Thaler (1987) , Haugen (1995) , and Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) have in mind, with the cycle repeating with each new vintage of growth and value stocks.
Does asset pricing in a world where the misinformed over-extrapolate the past fortunes of growth and value stocks move away from the CAPM to a multifactor version of Merton's (1973) ICAPM? Strictly speaking, the answer is no. In an ICAPM, the market portfolio is not meanvariance-efficient, but it is multifactor efficient in the sense of Fama (1996) . Since the portfolio actions of the misinformed are based on incorrect beliefs, it is unlikely they produce price effects that la nd the market portfolio on the multifactor efficient frontier. A multifactor ICAPM, like that of Fama and French (1993) , where the additional factors are portfolios of value and growth stocks may nevertheless provide a good approximation to average returns. The model should, however, be rejected in large samples.
E. Active Management
There is much evidence that active investment managers (stock pickers) generally underperform passive benchmarks. (Two recent papers are Carhart, 1997, and Asness, Krail, and Liew, 2001 .) It is nevertheless widely believed that active managers help make prices rational and that prices are less rational when active managers switch to a passive market portfolio strategy. Indeed, this is often offered as a justification for the existence of active managers, despite poor performance. The analysis above provides a simple framework for analyzing (i) the impact of active management on prices, and (ii) what happens to market efficiency when active managers switch to a passive market portfolio strategy.
In our model, active managers make prices more rational only when they are among the informed. The price effects of misinformed managers are like those of other misinformed investors: trading based on bad beliefs makes prices less rational. And the world is a better place (prices are more rational) when misinformed investors admit their ignorance and switch to a passive market portfolio strategy. This typically reduces the overweighting and underweighting of assets left for informed investors to offset. The difference between the tangency portfolio T and the market portfolio M shrinks and market efficiency improves.
In one special case switching misinformed investors to a passive market portfolio strategy makes prices less rationa l. This happens when the old portfolio choices of the newly passive investors happen to offset those of other misinformed investors -overweighting assets the others underweight and vice versa. Since these misinformed investors act like informed investors, converting them to a passive market portfolio strategy likely increases the gap between T and M and reduces market efficiency. In general, however, converting misinformed investors to the market portfolio makes prices more rational. For example, if all misinformed investors turn passive and switch to the market portfolio, then D = M, which means asset prices must induce the informed to also hold M. The tangency portfolio, T, is then the market portfolio M, the CAPM holds, and prices are the rational result of the beliefs of the informed.
On the other hand, when active managers do have superior information, they are among the informed investors who partially offset the portfolio choices of the misinformed and so make asset prices more rational. And market efficiency is reduced when informed investors switch to a passive market portfolio strategy. Because the remaining informed investors are risk averse, they do not take up all the slack left by newly passive informed investors, and the misinformed have a larger impact on prices.
In our model informed investors generate positive values of Jensen's alpha, and the misinformed have negative alphas. The performance evaluation literature (for example, Carhart, 1997) suggests that, judged on alphas, the ranks of the informed among active managers are at best thin, and the ranks of the misinformed are more robust. Perhaps informed active managers act like rational monopolists and absorb the expected return benefits of their superior information with higher fees and expenses. But the performance evaluation literature suggests that the ranks of the informed remain thin when returns are measured before fees and expenses. Carhart (1997) is puzzled by his evidence that there are mutual fund managers (about ten percent of the total number but a smaller fraction of aggregate mutual fund assets) who generate reliably negative estimates of Jensen's alpha, before fees and expenses. This is a puzzle only if prices are completely rational so the misinformed are protected from the adverse price effects of their erroneous beliefs. In our model, if the misinformed do not in aggregate hold the market portfolio, their erroneous beliefs affect prices, and they pay for their beliefs with negative alphas.
The practical implication of this is that, even ignoring fees and expenses, a bad choice of active managers can be hazardous to your wealth.
Overall, however, the evidence from the performance evaluation literature is that both informed and misinformed active managers are difficult to identify. This can be good news or bad news. It is good news if the cost of becoming informed is low. Then there are many informed investors, and the returns to being informed are low because prices are near completely rational. But it is bad n ews (for the capitalist system itself) if it means that it is extremely difficult or costly to become informed. In this case there are few if any informed investors, and prices are quite irrational but in random ways that are difficult to identify in empirical tests.
Finally, our simple model ignores portfolio management costs, but it does produce an interesting insight about their potential price effects. When there are informed and misinformed investors, it is hard to say whether portfolio management costs make prices more or less rational.
Because costs deter some trading by the misinformed, they tend to reduce the perverse price effects of erroneous beliefs. But portfolio management costs also dampen the response of informed investors to the actions of the misinformed. Since costs impede both the misinformed, who distort prices, and the informed, who counter the distortions, w e would need a more complex model to assess the net effect of portfolio management costs on market efficiency.
II. Tastes for Assets
A common assumption in asset pricing models is that investors are concerned only with the monetary payoffs from their portfolios; that is, investment assets are not also consumption goods. This assumption is arbitrary. We provide a simple analysis of how tastes for assets as consumption goods can affect asset prices. We consider two cases. (i) Utility depends directly on the quantities of assets held.
(ii) Tastes for assets as consumption goods depend on the covariances of asset returns with common return factors or state variables.
A. Tastes for Assets Do Not Depend on Returns
For simplicity, assume there is complete agreement and asset prices are rational. At time 1, investors must allocate current wealth, W 1 , to pure time 1 consumption goods and to n assets that generate the wealth to be split between consumption and investment at time 2. The tastes of investor i are described by the utility function U i (C 1 , q 1 ,…, q n , W 2 ), where C 1 is the dollar value of time 1 pure consumption goods, q 1 ,…, q n are the dollar investment s in the n portfolio assets, W 2 = S j q j (1 + R j ) is the wealth at time 2 from investments at time 1, and S j q j = W 1 -C 1 .
The idea conveyed by U i (C 1 , q 1 ,…, q n , W 2 ) is that the investor gets utility from the dollar amounts of different assets held at time 1, just as he gets utility from C 1 . The utility of time 2 wealth may depend on q 1 ,…, q n (the utility function may not be separable), just as the utility of W 2 may depend on C 1 . Utility need not depend on time 1 holdings of all assets and the holdings with zero marginal utility can differ across investors. We also assume that some investors, called Suppose all assumptions of the CAPM hold, except some investors have tastes for assets as consumption goods. As usual, group A investors (no such tastes) combine riskfree borrowing or lending with the true mean-variance-efficient (MVE) tangency portfolio T of risky assets. A group D investor also combines riskfree borrowing or lending with a portfolio of risky assets.
But the risky portfolio chosen in part depends on the investor's tastes for assets as consumption goods, so it is not typically in the unconditional MVE set. Since the investor is risk averse, his portfolio is conditionally MVE: given the investments in assets with non-zero marginal utility as consumption goods, the portfolio maximizes expected return given its variance.
As usual, market clearing prices require that the market portfolio of risky securities is the aggregate of the risky portfolios chosen by investors. We can again express this market clearing condition as,
where w jD is the weight of asset j in the wealth-weighted aggregate portfolio of the risky portfolios of group D investors, and x is the share of group A investors in total wealth invested in risky assets.
As indicated by the choice of symbols, this equilibrium is like the one obtained when deviations from CAPM pricing are due to misinformed investors. Again, asset prices must be set to induce group A investors to offset the actions of group D investors; that is, investors in group A overweight (relative to the market portfolio) the assets underweighted by investors in group D.
But in terms of price effects, the offset is partial; we do not get CAPM pricing except in the unlikely case where the tastes of group D investors are perfectly offsetting and in aggregate they hold the tangency portfolio T, which then must also be the market portfolio M.
Other results like those obtained when group D investors are misinformed also hold. For example, since the aggregate portfolio of group D investors is not unconditionally MVE, the market portfolio also is not MVE, and this central implication of the CAPM is lost. And because we have not identified the aggregate portfolio of group D investors, we cannot identify group A's tangency portfolio T, which is MVE and so could be used to describe the expected returns on assets. Thus, testable predictions about expected return and risk are lost. But if tastes for assets as consumption goods are the only potential problem for the CAPM, we can at least use the GRS F-test and estimates of Jensen's alpha to infer whether such tastes actually affect asset prices.
Some examples are helpful. "Socially responsible investing" is an extreme form of tastes for assets as consumption goods that are unrelated to returns. Thus, some investors do not hold the stocks of tobacco companies, or gun manufacturers. In a world where all other assumptions of the CAPM hold, socially responsible investors hold portfolios that are conditionally MVE, given their asset exclusions, but their portfolios are not unconditionally MVE. Another example is loyalty or the desire to belong that leads to utility from holding the stock of one's employer (Cohen, 2003) , one's favorite animated characters, or one's favorite sports team that is unrelated to the payoff characteristics of the stock. Again, when all other assumptions of the CAPM hold, such investors hold portfolios that are conditionally MVE, given their holdings of favored stocks, but the portfolios are not likely to be unconditionally MVE.
Even when employees do not have tastes for employer stock as a consumption good, options and grants that constrain an employee to hold the stock for some period of time affect portfolio decisions in the same way as tastes for the stock. Similarly, the lock-in effects of capital gains taxes can affect portfolio decisions and asset prices much like tastes for assets as consumption goods, and tax rates on investment returns that differ across assets distort portfolio decisions in much the same way. Finally, there may be investors who get pleasure from holding the common stocks of strong companies (growth stocks) and dislike holding distressed (value) stocks, and these tastes influence investment decisions. This seems to be what the characteristics model of Daniel and Titman (1997) is intended to capture.
B. Tastes for Investment Assets Depend on Their Returns
If investor utility depends directly on the amounts invested in specific assets, asset prices do not conform to the CAPM. And prices are unlikely to conform to follow Merton's (1973) ICAPM. ICAPM pricing arises when the utility of time 2 wealth, U i (C 1 , W 2 | S 2 ), depends on stochastic state variables, S 2 . Covariances of time 2 asset returns with the state variables then become an ingredient in portfolio decisions and asset pricing. In contrast, when utility U i (C 1 , q 1 ,…, q n , W 2 ) depends on the quantities of assets chosen at time 1, we do not get ICAPM pricing.
1 ICAPM pricing does arise, however, if investor tastes for assets as consumption goods depend not on the amount of each asset held, but instead on the covariances of asset returns with a limited number of common return factors or state variables. This is not, of course, the motivation for the ICAPM in Merton (1973) . He emphasizes that the utility of wealth depends on how it can be used to generate future consumption. Thus, utility is a function of the consumption goods that will be available in future periods and their prices. It also depends on the portfolio opportunities that will be available to move wealth through time for future consumption. Thus, the state variables, S 2 , are usually assumed t o be related to future consumption and investment opportunities. Another problem is that when one opens the door to tastes for assets as consumption goods as a source of ICAPM pricing, there may be a flood of applicants, and meaningful restrictions on expected returns may be lost. But this is a general problem in moving from the CAPM to the ICAPM. The ICAPM has interesting testable content only when the number of priced state variables is relatively small, whether the state variables trace to consumption and investment opportunities or to tastes.
III. Conclusions
How important are the price effects of disagreement? We do not know. But we do know how to address the question. If one is willing to take a stance on what asset pricing would look like with complete agreement, Jensen's alpha for this asset pricing model can in principle be used to distinguish informed investors from the misinformed. This is the approach used in studies of the performance of managed portfolios (primarily mutual funds). And it has proven difficult to identify informed managers. (See, for example, Carhart, 1997.) This may be due to low costs of information that lower expected returns to informed investors because prices are near completely rational.
Jensen's alpha and the GRS F-test can be used in a more general way to measure the price effects of erroneous beliefs. For example, estimates of alpha and the GRS test applied to portfolios of common stocks sorted on various characteristic s of firms produce evidence that the CAPM cannot explain expected stock returns. Two of these CAPM "anomalies" attract the most attention, and controversy. The first is the value effect (Statman, 1980 , Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein, 1985 , Fama and French, 1992 : stocks with low prices relative to fundamentals like cash flow or book value have higher average returns than predicted by the CAPM. The second is the momentum effect of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) : stocks with high returns over the last year tend to continue to have high returns for a few months, low short-term past returns also tend to persist, and these patterns in returns are left unexplained by the CAPM.
If the CAPM would hold in the presence of complete agreement, then the value effect and the momentum effect can be attributed to misinformed beliefs -market inefficiency, due perhaps to the behavioral biases discussed by DeBondt and Thaler (1987) , Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) . This is essentially the argument of these papers and of Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) and Haugen (1995) .
It is possible, however, that tastes for assets as consumption goods have a role in explaining the value effect or the momentum effect. It may be that investor tastes for growth stocks and distastes for (relatively distressed) value stocks are at least part of the reason the CAPM cannot explain the value effect. If so, the problem is a bad asset pricing model (no allowance for asset tastes), not bad asset prices. Such differences in tastes seem to be what the characteristics model of Daniel and Titman (1997) is intended to capture. Perhaps investor tastes for recent losers and distastes for recent winners also contribute to the momentum effect. It is unlikely, however, that tastes explain both the value effect and the momentum effect, since the value effect requires that investors like winners and dislike losers and the momentum effect requires the opposite. Fama and French (1993) argue that the value effect can be explained by a multifactor version of Merton's (1973) ICAPM. In this view, however, there is still an open issue. Does the priced state variable that produces the value effect trace to uncertainty about future consumptioninvestment opportunities (the standard ICAPM story), or does it reflect investor distaste for a state variable that might simply be wealth generated by distressed or humdrum activities?
An ICAPM story, of either variety, seems an unlikely explanation of momentum. The momentum effect is a property of short-term future returns on recent short-term winners and losers. It seems unlikely that covariances of stock returns with a state variable change dramatically, but only temporarily, based on short-term past returns. But perhaps we are wrong.
We do not have and may never have definitive answers to the questions posed above.
But our analysis does provide a framework for thinking about potential answers.
Finally, our analysis may provide perspective on the asset pricing information delivered by the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) . It is possible that disagreement, tastes for assets as consumptions goods, and state variable risks all play a role in asset pricing. Whatever the forces generating asset prices, the mean-variance-efficient tangency portfolio T can always be used, along with the riskfree rate, to describe differences in expected asset returns. In the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM, T is the market portfolio M. But when asset pricing is affected by disagreement, tastes for assets as consumption goods, and state variable risks, T is no longer M, and theory no longer specifies the composition of T. One (perhaps the only) approach to capturing T is to form a set of diversified portfolios that seem to cover observed differences in average returns. If these portfolios span T, they can be used (along with the riskfree rate) to describe differences in expected asset returns (Huberman and Kandel, 1987) . And one can be agnostic about whether T is not M because of disagreement, tastes for assets as consumptions goods, state variable risks, or an amalgam of the three. This may, in the end, be a reasonable view of the pricing information captured by the three-factor model. 
